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Abstract
The federal system of governance has been posited as a solution to issues of internal conflict and
division within states. Over the last century the global prevalence of the federal system has increased.
There are currently twenty-six states (accounting for forty per cent of the global population) that have or
are in the process of adopting a federal system—including three of the so-called “BRIC” emerging global
powers. While the motivating theory of the federal system is one that often seeks to pacify, contain, or
eliminate conflict among subnational groups and governments, such an ideal is not as easily achieved in
practice. Many federal states are formed amidst conflict and competing visions of national identity. Thus,
it is often not only the division of power and resources within the federation that is contested but also the
framework of the federation itself. This underlying struggle is borne out in political arenas through selfdetermination movements and in courts through legal disputes over division of powers. In turn, states rely
on federal institutions to proactively and reactively address intra-state conflict. Situated among these
institutions are “federal arbiters” who serve the critical role of adjudicating conflicts over power and
resources.
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Book Review

The Judicial Role in a Diverse Federation:
Lessons from the Supreme Court of
Canada, by Robert Schertzer1
KIRANDEEP MAHAL2
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE has been posited as a solution to issues

of internal conflict and division within states.3 Over the last century the global
prevalence of the federal system has increased. There are currently twenty-six states
(accounting for forty per cent of the global population) that have or are in the
process of adopting a federal system4—including three of the so-called “BRIC”
emerging global powers. While the motivating theory of the federal system is
one that often seeks to pacify, contain, or eliminate conflict among subnational
groups and governments, such an ideal is not as easily achieved in practice.
Many federal states are formed amidst conflict and competing visions of national
identity. Thus, it is often not only the division of power and resources within the
federation that is contested but also the framework of the federation itself. This
underlying struggle is borne out in political arenas through self-determination
movements and in courts through legal disputes over division of powers. In turn,
states rely on federal institutions to proactively and reactively address intra-state
conflict. Situated among these institutions are “federal arbiters” who serve the
critical role of adjudicating conflicts over power and resources.
1.
2.
3.
4.

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) 306 pages.
JD Candidate (2018), Osgoode Hall Law School.
Schertzer, supra note 1 at 35-36.
Ibid at 7, n 11. “BRIC” is an acronym in economics that refers to the countries of Brazil,
Russia, India and China.
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In The Judicial Role in a Diverse Federation: Lessons from the Supreme Court of
Canada, Robert Schertzer employs Canada and its Supreme Court as a case study
to examine the role of apex courts as federal arbiters managing national diversity
and conflict. Working from two foundational premises—the impetus on federal
institutions to generate legitimacy for the federation and the inherently contested
nature of the federation—Schertzer’s book integrates a novel theoretical approach
to viewing the role of apex courts as federal arbiters with an in-depth empirical
analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s federalism jurisprudence. Drawing
from 131 Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decisions spanning three decades,
Schertzer’s analysis suggests that the SCC has managed conflict over national
identity and the federation “in both problematic and beneficial ways.”5
Schertzer’s book addresses a “relatively under examined and under theorized”
area in federal theory—the role of federal arbiters in “comparative federal and
conflict management studies.”6 In this respect, the focus on Canada is advantageous
and it follows a trend in comparative federalism of recognizing Canada as a key
case.7 Firstly, Schertzer frames Canada as a plurinational federation in which
members of the federation do not subscribe to one single, unifying definition of
the nation.8 Schertzer identifies three dominant federal models that emerge from
scholarship on Canadian federalism and can be discerned in SCC jurisprudence:
pan-Canadian, provincial equality, and multinational.9 Secondly, the SCC is
often called upon to mediate federalism disputes, which has led to a significant
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

Ibid at 8-9.
Ibid at 62.
See e.g. Thomas O Hueglin & Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 2nd
ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); Gerald Baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial
Doctrine in the United States, Australia, and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Michael
Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006); Jan Erk,
Explaining Federalism: State, Society and Congruence in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany
and Switzerland, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Jan Erk & Lawrence M Anderson, eds, The
Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? (New York:
Routledge, 2010).
Ibid at 7. On plurinationalism, see Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless
Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Ferran
Requejo & Miquel Caminal Badia, eds, Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic
Constitutionalism: Theory and Cases (New York: Routledge, 2012); Ugo M Amoretti
& Nancy Bermeo, eds, Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004).
Schertzer, supra note 1 at 48. Schertzer draws primarily from the work of François Rocher
and Miriam Smith. François Rocher & Miriam Smith, “The Four Dimensions of Canadian
Federalism,” in François Rocher & Miriam Smith, eds, New Trends in Canadian Federalism,
2nd ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 21 at 22, 38-40.
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body of jurisprudence spanning a range of division of powers issues. In recent
decades, questions of critical constitutional importance have been referred to
the SCC during deeply divided political and social points in Canadian history.10
It would come as no surprise to those familiar with the Supreme Court of
Canada that it has significantly influenced the development of the federation
of Canada.11 What is perhaps less understood is how the SCC carries out its
role as federal arbiter and the corresponding impact it has on the legitimacy of
differing views of the federation and of the federation itself.12 This is the gap
in the literature that Schertzer’s work meticulously fills through theoretical and
empirical rigour.
Schertzer argues that federal arbiters, in fulfilling their conflict management
duties, hold a “special status”13 in the development of the federation and the
maintenance of its legitimacy in diverse states. Schertzer contends that federal
arbiters are a part of the “very system being challenged.” Thus, when they are
faced with adjudicating challenges to the federal system the legitimacy of the
federal arbiter itself also hangs in the balance.14 The ways in which apex courts
manage conflict “can either negatively affect the legitimacy of the federal system
or generate legitimacy.”15
Schertzer’s focus on legitimacy is of particular note in understanding the
arguments advanced in the book. Schertzer defines legitimacy as “the belief in,
and acceptance of, the validity of a form of political association”16 and argues that
perceptions of legitimacy act as either a unifying or destabilizing force within a
federation. Thus, in order to reap the benefits of a federal system, legitimacy must
remain a central focus of institutional actors in managing conflict.

10. See e.g. Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, 125 DLR (3d) 1; Re:
Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793, 140 DLR
(3d) 385; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Secession
Reference]; Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837; Reference re Senate
Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704.
11. See e.g. Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical
Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) ch 6; John T Saywell, The
Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002); Katherine E Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism:
The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
12. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 276.
13. Ibid at 68.
14. Ibid at 6.
15. Ibid at 62.
16. Ibid at 11.

668

(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

I. RECONCEPTUALISING THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITER
While federal theory and Canadian federalism jurisprudence have been the
subject of significant scholarly interest, Schertzer’s book fills gaps within and
across these areas of scholarship. Schertzer bridges the divide between theories of
the federal system and judicial review, forming links “between each ideal role for
the judiciary and [an ideal] federal approach and model.”17 Part I of The Judicial
Role in a Diverse Federation draws on general federal theory to discuss how states
approach the issue of national diversity.
In chapter two, this theoretical framework is applied to the dominant
federal models in Canada: pan-Canadian, provincial equality, and multinational.
Schertzer takes these models a step further by articulating the conceptualization
of the role of the judiciary that is embedded in each model. The pan-Canadian
model places the central government as the locus of a “single, comprehensive civic
political identity.”18 Under this framework the judiciary is called upon to act as a
neutral, independent umpire “adjudicating…in accordance with pre-established
rules.”19 The provincial equality model supports a decentralized view of the state
in which provinces “represent the primary political community of belonging”20
and the judiciary is seen as a branch of government providing checks and balances
to power.21 The multinational model views Canada as comprised of multiple
nations for whom power sharing and autonomy are justified.22 Sub-nations are
defined either as ethno-national units (e.g., Quebec, Nunavut, and Aboriginal
communities) or as provincial territorial units.23 The judiciary is viewed as a
guardian protecting the constitutional and federal system.24
Schertzer argues that these existing dominant approaches fail to account
for the “federal structure itself [being] contested,” and thereby overlook how
imposing a particular federal approach and model affects the legitimacy of the
federation.25 Drawing from these shortcomings, Schertzer advances a new federal

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ibid at 80.
Ibid at 50.
Ibid at 77.
Ibid at 50-51.
Ibid at 78.
Ibid at 51-52.
Ibid at 52.
Ibid at 79.
Ibid at 80.
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model “that sees federal systems as the process and outcome of negotiation” in which
the federal arbiter’s role is that of a broad facilitator of negotiation.26
This “ideal model” rejects the prioritization of one view of the federation
above others; instead it moves towards recognizing a dynamic federation in
which courts aim to facilitate “negotiation and political compromise.”27 Schertzer
suggests that the federal arbiter can facilitate this model by either (1) pushing
the conflicting parties back into political negotiations or (2) rejecting a zero-sum
approach to conflict resolution by reaching an outcome that validates and
accounts for competing perspectives.28
While this ideal model encourages compromise and dialogue within the
federation, the reality is that often negotiation may not be a viable option for
disputes that reach the level of the apex court. Further, the impetus to reject a
zero-sum outcome must be balanced with the expectation on courts to deliver
decisions with clear directives for the parties on the question(s) before them.
The strength of Schertzer’s approach lies in its recognition that the influence
of the federal arbiter does not rest solely with the disposition of the conflict.
Rather it is embedded in the way the decision is rendered. The manner in which
the apex court depicts the federation, reinforces this depiction through legal
argument, and recognizes that “continued disagreement is reasonable” influences
the legitimacy of its decision to parties beyond the clear “winner.”29 In this way,
it is open to the apex court to validate the contested nature of the federation and
render decisions in which the plurality of views of the federation may find fruit
for future conflict management.
Part II of the book leads off this point and demonstrates how this ideal
model has been achieved in practice through an examination of SCC
federalism jurisprudence.

II. EXAMINING THIRTY YEARS OF SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE
Canadian legal scholarship has benefited from a robust body of study concerning
the role the SCC has had in the development of the Canadian federation; however,
much of this scholarship focuses on the impacts of specific decisions, doctrines,

26.
27.
28.
29.

Ibid at 83 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 93.
Ibid at 93-94.
Ibid at 97.

670

(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

eras, or personalities of the Court.30 This is understandably so, given the sheer
breadth of cases touching on issues of federalism. In The Judicial Role in a Diverse
Federation, Schertzer views the Court as an institution and rises to the challenge of
taking a deep dive into Canadian federalism jurisprudence.31 Schertzer achieves
this by undertaking an empirical analysis spanning 131 decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court of Canada from 1980–2010.32 Beyond the analysis specific to
this book, Schertzer’s work provides a set of tabulated data that not only advances
an understanding of how the Court has managed federalism conflicts, but that
may also serve as a rich foundation for future research on Canadian federalism.
In Part II of the book, the theoretical foundation set out in Part I is applied
to develop an empirical framework through which trends in the Supreme Court
of Canada’s management of conflict are identified. Schertzer’s framework takes a
case-by-case, granular, and detail-oriented approach. Schertzer analyzes how the
federation is depicted in order to determine which federal model(s) have found
favour with the Court and identifies the constitutional modalities33 employed in
the legal argumentation. The framework also assesses the judgments’ outcomes
and the role assumed by the Court in each case.

30. See e.g. Wade K Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial Review of the
Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 625; Nathalie
Des Rosiers, “From Québec Veto to Québec Secession: The Evolution of the Supreme
Court of Canada on Québec-Canada Disputes” (2000) 13:2 Can JL & Jur 171; Gordon
DiGiacomo, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Federalism as Expressed in the Securities
Reference” (2012) Queen’s University Institute for Intergovernmental Relations Working
Paper No 2012/01; Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The ‘Principle’ of Federalism and
the Legacy of Patriation and Quebec Veto References” (2011) 54 SCLR 77.
31. Schertzer recognizes that while the views of individual judges may help to explain “why
the Court shifts its conception of the federation over time” the Court’s power ultimately
is derived from “the normative force it wields as the apex court of the [Canadian] judicial
system.” Ibid at 110. Recent scholarship suggests that a view of the Court as an “institution”
may be apt and appropriate for the SCC. See Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and
Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 52 SCLR (2d) 379 (on unanimous
judgments in the Supreme Court of Canada); Peter McCormick “‘By the Court’: The Untold
Story of a Canadian Judicial Innovation” (2016) 53:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 1048 (on the rise of
judgments by “THE COURT”).
32. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 113-14.
33. Constitutional modalities are “method(s) through which legal propositions about the
constitution are given a meaning” (e.g., historical, doctrinal, textual, and progressive
approaches). See ibid at 125-26. Schertzer builds on the taxonomy employed by Philip
Bobbitt (ibid at 125). See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
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The rigour of Schertzer’s analysis is exemplified in chapter four of the book
in which a discussion of the Reference Re Secession of Quebec (Secession Reference)34
provides a window into the application of the new empirical framework. Using
the Secession Reference as the benchmark embodying the “ideal model,” Schertzer
identifies two streams of jurisprudence—one in which the SCC imposes a
particular view of the federation and one in which the SCC reinforces the
legitimacy of multiple views.
The Court rendered the Secession Reference in a time of ‘crisis’35 in which there
was a “direct challenge to the legitimacy of the constitutional and federal system”36
in Canada. While commentators have characterized the Court’s reasoning in the
Secession Reference as resorting to “abstract normativity…[and]…extra-ordinary
adjudication”37 and reflecting “strategic decision making” rooted in an effort to
reinforce the legitimacy of the Court as a federal institution,38 Schertzer’s analysis
suggests that the impact of this decision was much broader. Schertzer argues
that the Secession Reference is an “exemplar” of recognizing the federation as
the process and outcome of negotiations and of the way in which the federal
arbiter can legitimize competing perspectives of the federation. A bird’s eye
view of the empirical analysis finds that the Secession Reference marked a shift in
SCC federalism jurisprudence from imposing a particular federal model towards
“recogniz[ing] the legitimacy of multiple federal models and the federation as the
process and outcome of negotiation between the subscribers of these models.”39
34. In this advisory judgment the SCC considered three specific questions relating to the legality of
unilateral secession by the province of Quebec under Canadian and international law. Secession
Reference, supra note 11 at para 2 (for full text of the questions referred to the Court).
35. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 140.
36. Ibid at 164.
37. See Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, “Constitutional Theory and The Quebec Secession
Reference” (2000) 13:2 Can JL & Jur 143 at 168. Choudhry and Howse highlight three
unconventional aspects of the decision. First, they point out the decision’s “reliance on
abstract, unwritten constitutional principles” beyond the written text of the constitution
to create a new framework for governing secession. Ibid at 149, see also 154. Second, they
reference the decision’s interpretative responsibility, namely the Court’s decision to vest
“primary responsibility for contextualizing the constitutional rules governing secession” with
political actors rather than the courts. Ibid at 149, see also 157). Third, they highlight the
decision’s interpretative style, specifically the Court’s articulation of “a normative vision for
the Canadian constitutional order.” Ibid at 164.
38. See e.g. Vuk Radmilovic, “Strategic Legitimacy Cultivation at the Supreme Court of Canada:
Quebec Secession Reference and Beyond” (2010) 43:4 Can J Pol Sci 843.
39. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 220. Under Schertzer’s framework of analysis, seventy-eight per
cent of post-Secession Reference federalism jurisprudence reflected a recognizing approach,
as opposed to merely forty-three per cent of federalism jurisprudence pre-Secession Reference.
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Schertzer substantiates this argument by devoting chapters five and six to
analyzing decisions in the imposing and recognizing streams of SCC jurisprudence.
In these chapters, Schertzer summarizes the key characteristics of an imposing as
opposed to a recognizing case, the trends that emerge within these two streams
of jurisprudence, and the corresponding implications for the legitimacy of
the federation.
The analysis presented in Part II raises two interconnected issues. First,
as Schertzer notes at the onset of his book, the apex court does not exist in a
vacuum. Rather, it is a part of the very system that is being contested. Accordingly,
as commentators have suggested in relation to the Secession Reference, the Court
is attuned to the social and political implications of the decisions it must render.
This begs the question of the degree to which the circumstances surrounding
a particular case may influence the impetus to advance an “imposing” versus
an “accommodating” stance by the Court. The temporal and substantive ranges
in the cases Schertzer analyzes demonstrate that the trends identified transcend
particular points of conflict or issues. However, the analysis is confined primarily
to an investigation of the decisions rendered, with a secondary focus on the
political and social climate surrounding the decision and their actual impacts
on perceptions of legitimacy within the federation. These may serve as fruitful
areas for future research, building on the rich data set generated by Schertzer’s
empirical study.
Second, one may grapple with whether the SCC is, in fact, imposing or
recognizing certain models in its decision, or whether it is instead more accurate
to suggest that decisions are driven by doctrine and the factual circumstances of
a case. To this point, Schertzer contends that “underlying theories of federalism
structure judicial decision making,”40 and that, as discussed above, it is not
solely the disposition of a decision that holds force but rather the reasoning and
depiction of the federation that rationalize the outcome. Schertzer illustrates this
by recasting the SCC’s analysis in Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan in order
to demonstrate that legitimizing competing views of the federation may not be
mutually exclusive with the necessity of adjudicating an outcome.41

40. Ibid at 282.
41. Ibid at 283-85; Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525,
83 DLR (4th) 297.
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III. CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL AND NATIONAL FEDERAL
THEORY
While the book centres on Canada as a case study, Schertzer contextualizes his
analysis within broader federal theory. The Judicial Role in a Diverse Federation
provides a rich theoretical and empirical foundation for comparative study
that may be used to inform conflict management in other plurinational federal
states and states where “conflict over the nature of nationality”42 is prevalent.
Furthermore, the application of Schertzer’s ideal model to the SCC highlights the
importance of the federal arbiter and serves as a window of comparison for other
federal states into how decision making by apex courts may affect legitimacy.
In recent years, studies of traditional topics of federalism in Canada have
arguably given way to rights-oriented scholarship focusing on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.43 The ideas advanced in this book and the
granularity of the empirical analysis provide a basis for future scholarship on
federalism theory and jurisprudence in Canada. In particular, as Canadian legal
and political spheres respond to the call to action of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission report44 and begin to act on a commitment to reconciliation with
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, governments and courts will be called upon
to negotiate a comprehensive vision of the federation in which Aboriginal
self-government holds a fundamental and operative role.45 In this respect,
42. Ibid at 301.
43. See Patrick Fafard & François Rocher, “The Evolution of Federalism Studies in Canada:
From Centre to Periphery” (2009) 52:2 Can Pub Adm 291.
44. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling the
Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada
(Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, 2015).
45. As of 2015, Canada had signed twenty-two self-government agreements and there were
approximately ninety self-government negotiation tables across the country. See Indigenous
and Northern Affairs Canada, “Fact Sheet: Aboriginal Self-Government” (2 April 2015),
online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016293/1100100016294>. Active scholarship
exists on the role of federal theory and federalism to recognize, affirm, and implement
Section 35 Aboriginal rights including the right to self-government. This scholarship suggests
that theories of federalism in Canada can and should evolve to effectively operationalize
Aboriginal rights. Of particular note is the potential for the courts and the Supreme Court
of Canada to contribute by adapting legal doctrines of federalism when adjudicating
disputes and defining the parameters that will govern the division of power and resources
in this new era of the federation. See e.g. Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) ch 6; Martin Papillon,
“Towards Postcolonial Federalism? The Challenges of Aboriginal Self-Determination
in the Canadian Context” in Alain-G Gagnon, ed, Contemporary Canadian Federalism:
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Schertzer’s focus on Canada as a plurinational state is apt and timely. While
the SCC’s post-Secession Reference shift may not reflect a calculated effort by the
Court to follow a new federal model to the exclusion of others, Schertzer’s work
gives pause for reflection on what may be achieved in a federation when conflicts
that reach the highest legal arena are approached from a place of negotiation
rather than imposition.

Foundations, Traditions, Institutions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 405;
Martin Papillon & André Juneau, eds, Canada: The State of the Federation 2013: Aboriginal
Multilevel Governance (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015); Mark Mancini,
“Wandering Without a Torch: Federalism as a Guiding Light” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 369; Jean
Leclair, “Federal Constitutionalism and Aboriginal Difference” (2006) 31:2 Queen’s LJ 521;
Dwight G Newman, “Aboriginal ‘Rights’ as Powers: Section 35 and Federalism Theory” in
Graeme Mitchell et al, eds, A Living Tree: The Legacy of 1982 in Canada’s Political Evolution
(Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2007) 527.

